| i | | | - ~ |
|------------------------------|--|--|-----|
| | DEPARTMENT OF STATE | IS/FPC/CDR PS Date 5/29/17 | FX |
| <<<<.>>>>> CONFIDENTIAL | (X) RELEASE (X) DECLASSIFY () EXCISE () DECLASSIFY () DENY IN PART () DELETE Non-Responsive Info FOIA Exemptions | MR Cases Only: EO Citations TS authority to. () CLASSIFY as () S or | 3 |
| PAGE 01 BON ACTION EUR-00 | PA Exemptions N 34271 01 OF 06 251756Z | () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or | |

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12 SP-02 M-01 SR-06 SNP-01 PRS-01 SDEL-01 SART-01 E-01 P-02 T-01 /072 W

O 251752Z OCT 89 FM AMEMBASSY BONN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9533 INFO FRG COLLECTIVE CSCE COLLECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 06 BONN 34271

-----035561 251823Z /46

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GE

USIA WASHDC 1611

SUBJECT: THE GERMAN QUESTION AND REUNIFICATION

REFS: (A) BONN 26793 (NOTAL); (B) BONN 29785

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SURGE IN EAST GERMANS DEPARTING THE GDR TO FIND FREEDOM IN THE FRG, RAPID CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND PROSPECTS FOR GREATER INTEGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE HAVE SPARKED A PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE FRG ON THE CHANCES FOR EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION. THE QUESTION OF REUNIFICATION, WE BELIEVE, CAN ONLY BE ADDRESSED IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE IDEA OF REUNIFICATION IS VERY MUCH ON GERMANS' MINDS, VIRTUALLY NO ONE BELIEVES REUNIFICATION IS THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS ON THE GERMAN-GERMAN AGENDA. IN FACT, SOME LEADING WEST GERMANS ARE CALLING FOR LESS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 34271 01 OF 06 251756Z

RHETORIC ON REUNIFICATION TO ALLAY ANXIETIES AMONG GERMANY'S WESTERN AND EASTERN NEIGHBORS. END SUMMARY.

3. AS LARGE NUMBERS OF EAST GERMANS WERE BEGINNING TO STREAM TO WEST GERMAN MISSIONS IN EAST BERLIN, BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, AND WARSAW IN MID-SUMMER, CHANCELLOR KOHL IN AN AUGUST 22 PRESS CONFERENCE ANNOUNCED THAT THE REJECTION BY THESE EAST GERMANS OF THE GDR STATE HAD CLEARLY SHOWN THAT "THE GERMAN QUESTION WAS STILL ON THE AGENDA" (REFTEL). BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE FRG, "THE GERMAN QUESTION" IS OFTEN USED AS ANOTHER TERM FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION. BUT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS, THE GERMAN QUESTION IS A BROADER ISSUE, INCLUDING THE NATURE OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS, THE GERMAN ROLE IN EAST-WEST SECURITY IN THE POST-WAR ORDER, AND FINALLY WEST GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS WITHIN THAT CONTEXT THAT WE OFFER AN ANALYSIS OF THE REUNIFICATION DEBATE IN THE FRG TODAY.

THE ORIGINS OF THE GERMAN QUESTION

4. THE CREATION OF THE FRG AND GDR, BOTH OF WHICH CELEBRATED THEIR FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY THIS YEAR, SYMBOLIZED THE DIVERGENT WESTERN AND SOVIET VIEWS OF HOW TO STRUCTURE THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE DIVISION OF GERMANY, WHICH IN EFFECT MARKED THE DIVISION OF EUROPE, WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF COLD WAR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SOVIETS, WHO AS A RESULT OF WORLD WAR II HAD ESTABLISHED A FOOTHOLD IN CENTRAL EUROPE, PLACED (AND CONTINUE TO PLACE) A HIGH PRIORITY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DURABILITY OF A COMMUNIST GERMAN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 34271 01 OF 06 251756Z

STATE.

5. THE WESTERN POWERS FORESAW A PEACEFUL CENTRAL EUROPE AS AN OUTCOME OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FIRM DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY. IN PART, THEY SUPPORTED THE GOAL OF A WESTERN-ORIENTED, REUNIFIED GERMANY BECAUSE IT WOULD ALSO LEAD TO THE EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ENORMOUS SOVIET FORCES FROM THE EASTERN ZONE OF GERMANY, THEREBY WEAKENING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AND WESTERN EUROPE. THE WESTERN POWERS CODIFIED THIS CONNECTION BETWEEN REUNIFICATION AND THE GERMAN QUESTION IN THE 1952 RELATIONS CONVENTION, WHICH IN 1955 BECAME THE BASIS FOR RETURNING SOVEREIGNTY TO THE FRG. SIGNED BY THE THREE WESTERN POWERS AND THE FRG, ARTICLE 7(2) OF THE CONVENTION STATES "PENDING THE PEACE SETTLEMENT, THE SIGNATORY STATES



WILL COOPERATE TO ACHIEVE, BY PEACEFUL MEANS, THEIR COMMON AIM OF A REUNIFIED GERMANY ENJOYING A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, LIKE THAT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AND INTEGRATED WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY."

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 34271 02 OF 06 251757Z ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12 SP-02 M-01 SR-06 SNP-01 PRS-01 SDEL-01 SART-01 E-01 P-02 T-01 /072 W

O 251752Z OCT 89 FM AMEMBASSY BONN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9534 INFO FRG COLLECTIVE CSCE COLLECTIVE



USIA WASHDC 1612

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 06 BONN 34271

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GE

SUBJECT: THE GERMAN QUESTION AND REUNIFICATION

6. WEST GERMANY'S ANCHORING IN THE WEST, NOT LEAST OF ALL BY A STATED COMMITMENT TO NATO, HAS BEEN A PRIMARY FOCUS OF FRG POLICY SINCE THE EARLY FIFTIES. THE FRG'S WESTERN, INDEED EUROPEAN, IDENTITY, HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF WEST GERMAN SENSITIVITY THROUGHOUT THE YEARS. FOR EXAMPLE, THIS SPRING, WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS INTERPRETED ALLIED STANCES ON SNF AS A "LOYALTY TEST" FOR THE FRG. PUBLIC DISCUSSION OUTSIDE OF THE FRG ON REUNIFICATION SIMILARLY GENERATES SENSITIVITY AMONG LEADING WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS ON HOW THE WEST (AND THE EAST) VIEWS THE FRGS POLITICAL ATTACHMENTS. IN RECENT WEEKS THIS HAS LED A NUMBER OF FRG LEADERS (FROM THE SPD, CDU, FDP, AND GREENS) TO ARGUE THAT EVERYONE WOULD BE BETTER OFF IF LESS WERE SAID IN PUBLIC ABOUT REUNIFICATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 34271 02 OF 06 251757Z

7. REUNIFICATION IS, HOWEVER, A HOTLY DEBATED ISSUE IN THE FRG. IT IS ALSO AN EMOTIONAL ONE. ALTHOUGH MOST WEST GERMANS STILL CONTINUE TO CONSIDER REUNIFICATION NOT TO BE THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS ON THE GERMAN-GERMAN AGENDA, SEVERAL FACTORS BEARING ON THE QUESTION ARE CHANGING RAPIDLY. THE PACE OF REFORM IN POLAND AND HUNGARY SHOWS NO SIGN OF SLOWING. CHANGE IN GDR LEADERSHIP HAS, IF ANYTHING, ONLY ENHANCED THE SENSE THAT THAT COUNTRY IS IN CRISIS. EUROPE 1992 HOLDS OUT THE PROSPECT FOR GREATER POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND DIMINISHMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL BORDERS. AND THE EMERGENCE OF GORBACHEV IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS UNLEASHED A HOPE THAT EVENTUALLY THE SOVIET UNION MAY LEARN TO LIVE WITH A WESTERN-ORIENTED DEMOCRATIC GERMANY THAT POSES NO THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

IN THE BEGINNING

8. THE GOAL OF A UNITED GERMANY IS EMBEDDED IN THE

PREAMBLE OF THE FRG BASIC LAW (CONSTITUTION) -- "THE ENTIRE GERMAN PEOPLE ARE CALLED UPON TO ACHIEVE IN FREE SELF-DETERMINATION THE UNITY AND FREEDOM OF GERMANY." LEGALLY, BONN REMAINS THE PROVISIONAL CAPITAL OF THE FRG UNTIL BERLIN AGAIN BECOMES THE CAPITAL OF A REUNIFIED GERMANY. IN A LANDMARK DECISION ON JULY 31, 1973, THE FRG CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ALSO RULED THAT EVERY FRG GOVERNMENT HAD TO REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE GOAL OF REUNIFICATION.

9. SUCCESSIVE FRG GOVERNMENTS HAVE PURSUED A POLICY OF PROMOTING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION WITHIN THE EC IN PART AS A MEANS TOWARD NATIONAL UNIFICATION. THERE IS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 34271 02 OF 06 251757Z

A BROAD NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN THE FRG THAT REUNIFICATION CANNOT BE PURSUED AS AN OPERATIONAL GOAL UNTIL EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IS A REALITY. IT IS THE FIRM BELIEF OF MOST GERMANS THAT SUCH INTEGRATION IS A GUARANTEE AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE TYPES OF CONFLICTS THAT PLAGUED THE REGION IN THE PAST.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

10. A CONSISTENT AIM OF WEST GERMAN POLICY SINCE THE FRG'S FOUNDATION HAS BEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY. INCREASING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WITH ITS WESTERN EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS SERVED THIS GOAL. THE FRG HAS TAKEN THE VIEW THAT POLITICAL INTEGRATION WOULD NATURALLY FOLLOW ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. THE PROSPECT OF A SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET IN 1992, FOLLOWED EVENTUALLY BY GREATER POLITICAL INTEGRATION, IS VIEWED HERE AS A NECESSARY BUT NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

. .:

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 34271 03 OF 06 251758Z ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12 SP-02 M-01 SR-06 SNP-01 PRS-01 SDEL-01 SART-01 E-01 P-02 T-01 /072 W

O 251752Z OCT 89 FM AMEMBASSY BONN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9535 INFO FRG COLLECTIVE CSCE COLLECTIVE USIA WASHDC 1613

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 06 BONN 34271

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GE

SUBJECT: THE GERMAN QUESTION AND REUNIFICATION

SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION. IN A PRACTICAL SENSE, MANY LEADING WEST GERMANS ALSO PERCEIVE THE EC AS ECONOMICALLY ATTRACTIVE TO THE WEAK ECONOMIES OF EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH CURRENTLY ARE IN NEED OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BUT IN THE FUTURE WILL WANT STABLE AND PROFITABLE TRADING RELATIONS WITH THE STRONG ECONOMIES IN WESTERN EUROPE. GENSCHER AND OTHERS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE EC SHOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO NEW FORMS OF COOPERATION AND PERHAPS EVEN INTEGRATION WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

| INI | THE | CHT | IDE |
|-----|-----|-----|------|
| HIN | IRE | rui | UKE. |

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 34271 03 OF 06 251758Z

11. ADHERENCE TO THE OBJECTIVE OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION IS AN ARTICLE OF FAITH AMONG WEST GERMANS. ONLY A SMALL FRINGE ELEMENT ON THE EXTREME LEFT HAS ABANDONED THE IDEA, AND WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS WHO DARE TO EXPRESS OPPOSITION TO REUNIFICATION ARE SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE PUBLIC CRITICISM AND THE LIKELY PROSPECT OF A SHORT POLITICAL CAREER.

12. THE BROAD NATIONAL CONSENSUS SUPPORTING THE AIM OF REUNIFICATION DOES NOT, HOWEVER, TRANSLATE INTO A CONSENSUS ON HOW TO GET THERE OR EVEN WHETHER IT IS ACHIEVABLE. POLLS CONSISTENTLY INDICATE THAT MORE THAN 80 PERCENT OF ALL WEST GERMANS FAVOR EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION, BUT LESS THAN 15 PERCENT BELIEVE THAT IT CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THEIR LIFETIME. WEST GERMANS ARE VISCERALLY DISAPPOINTED ABOUT THE ELUSIVENESS OF REUNIFICATION, WHILE CONVINCED THAT MOST OF GERMANY'S NEIGHBORS (WHETHER FRIEND OR FOE) WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE DEEP RESERVATIONS IF THERE WERE AN IMMINENT PROSPECT OF A REUNITED GERMANY.

EVENTS IN THE GDR

13. THE OUTPOURING OF EAST GERMANS FROM THE GDR TO THE FRG AND THE INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS UP TO NOW OF THE GDR LEADERSHIP TO COPE WITH POPULAR DISAFFECTION, ECONOMIC STAGNATION, AND PUBLIC PROTEST HAVE BEEN THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES FOR THE REAPPEARANCE OF REUNIFICATION AS A PUBLIC ISSUE IN THE FRG. BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, FRG LEADERS HAVE STATED THAT THE LAST THING THEY WANT IN THE GDR IS INSTABILITY. NEVERTHELESS, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT WHETHER OR NOT THE SED PURSUES REFORMS VOLUNTARILY, THE GDR IS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE AND IS LIKELY TO BE FORCED TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 34271 03 OF 06 251758Z

ADOPT REFORMS WHICH WOULD TRANSFORM THE SOCIETY (HOWEVER GLACIALLY) INTO A PLURALISTIC AND EVENTUALLY MORE WESTERN-ORIENTED STATE.

14. SINCE THE EARLY SEVENTIES, THE UNDERLYING TENSION IN THE FRG'S RELATIONS WITH THE GDR HAS BEEN THE FACT THAT WEST GERMANY'S ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IN ITS POLICY OF "SMALL STEPS" -- OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE POLICY OF DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION -- IS THE DISSOLUTION OF THE GDR STATE AS IT EXISTS TODAY. RECENT COMMENTS BY OTTO REINHOLD, A HIGH-RANKING SED THEORETICIAN, THAT THE GDR'S JUSTIFICATION FOR EXISTENCE WOULD BE UNDERCUT IF IT WERE NO LONGER COMMUNIST RESOUNDED THROUGH THE FRG. MOST WEST GERMANS BELIEVE THAT COMMUNISM DOES NOT HAVE A FUTURE IN THE GDR, RAISING THE INEVITABLE OUESTION OF WHY HAVE A GDR AT ALL. BOTH THE FRG'S TRADITIONAL POLICY OF SMALL STEPS AND REFORM IN THE GDR (VIEWED AS INEVITABLE) WILL DRAW THE GDR CLOSER TO THE FRG. WHAT HAPPENS AS THIS PROCESS OF DRAWING TOGETHER PROCEEDS (AND REINHOLD'S THESIS IS TESTED) IS THE DILEMMA ON WHICH THE REVIVAL OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 34271 04 OF 06 251813Z ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12 SP-02 M-01 SR-06 SNP-01 PRS-01 SDEL-01 SART-01 E-01 P-02 T-01 /072 W

-----036464 251825Z /46

O 251752Z OCT 89 FM AMEMBASSY BONN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9536 INFO FRG COLLECTIVE CSCE COLLECTIVE USIA WASHDC 1614

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 06 BONN 34271

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL. PGOV. GE

SUBJECT: THE GERMAN QUESTION AND REUNIFICATION

REUNIFICATION DEBATE IS BASED.

THE SOVIET CARD

15. ALTHOUGH WEST GERMANS RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO DESIRE TO PROMOTE A REUNIFIED GERMANY ON THE BASIS OF SELF-DETERMINATION, THEY ARE EQUALLY AWARE THAT REUNIFICATION COULD NOT COME ABOUT WITHOUT AT LEAST SOVIET ACQUIESCENCE. THE UNANSWERED QUESTION FOR MOST WEST GERMANS WHO THINK ABOUT WAYS TO ACHIEVE REUNIFICATION IS UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO RELINQUISH THEIR POSITION IN THE THE GDR.

16. THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE GDR IS MANIFESTED BY ITS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 34271 04 OF 06 251813Z

400,000 OR SO TROOPS THERE. IN THE GORBACHEV ERA, FEW WEST GERMANS BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ENTERTAIN AS AN OPTION A REPETITION OF JUNE 1953, WHEN SOVIET TROOPS HELPED QUASH PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE STATE. NEVERTHELESS, WEST GERMAN LEADERS ARE ACUTELY AWARE THAT THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS A FUNDAMENTAL

INTEREST. SOME WEST GERMANS HAVE NOTED IN THIS REGARD SOVIET INTEREST IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSAL FOR A REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND U.S. TROOP STRENGTHS IN EUROPE OUTSIDE OF NATIONAL TERRITORY TO 275,000 EACH. IF THIS PROPOSAL IS ULTIMATELY ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE CONSEQUENCE WOULD BE A SIZEABLE REDUCTION IN SOVIET TROOP STRENGTH IN THE GDR, PROBABLY TO A LEVEL BELOW 200,000. SUCH A REDUCTION WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL IMPACT IN THE GDR.

17. WEST GERMANS HAVE CLOSELY FOLLOWED STATEMENTS BY LEADING SOVIET OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY GORBACHEV, TO DETECT ANY SOVIET "NEW THINKING" ON POSSIBLE REUNIFICATION. ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV, MOST RECENTLY IN HIS SPEECH IN EAST BERLIN. HAS GIVEN THE WEST GERMANS LITTLE HOPE IN THIS AREA. FRG LEADERS WERE EXHILIRATED WHEN GORBACHEV DURING HIS JUNE VISIT TO BONN AGREED TO A REFERENCE TO "SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES" IN THE JOINT FRG-SOVIET POLITICAL DECLARATION. OPERATIONALLY, FRG LEADERS SIMPLY DO NOT FORESEE IN THE SHORT-TERM SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE FRG AND GDR, LET ALONE A UNIFIED GERMANY. THEY BELIEVE INSTEAD THAT HISTORICAL PRESSURES WILL CONTINUE TO DRIVE THE TWO GERMANIES CLOSER TOGETHER, AND THAT EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION WILL BE THE RESULT OF AS YET UNPREDICTABLE EVENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE GDR.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 34271 04 OF 06 251813Z

EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

18. WEST GERMANY HAS BEEN FASCINATED BY THE RAPID PACE OF CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOVIET UNION, POLAND, AND HUNGARY. THE CHANGES THERE ARE VIEWED AS THE BEGINNING OF AN UNCHARTED PROCESS WHICH COULD LEAD TO A REALIGNMENT OF FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE, EVENTUALLY MAKING REUNIFICATION ACCEPTABLE TO GERMANY'S EASTERN NEIGHBORS. IF THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT GREATER INTEGRATION BETWEEN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE WEST, SO THE THINKING HERE GOES, THEN THE SOVIETS MIGHT ALSO ALLOW FOR GREATER COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST GERMANY -- A PRELIMINARY CONCESSION ON THE WAY TO REUNIFICATION.

19. A NUMBER OF WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS HAVE POINTED OUT TO

US POLISH LEADER GEREMEK'S AUGUST INTERVIEW IN AN FRG TABLOID WHICH LOOKED FORWARD TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION. ONE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 34271 05 OF 06 252031Z ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12 SP-02 M-01 SR-06 SNP-01 PRS-01 SDEL-01 SART-01 E-01 P-02 T-01 /072 W

O 251752Z OCT 89 FM AMEMBASSY BONN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9537 INFO FRG COLLECTIVE CSCE COLLECTIVE USIA WASHDC 1615

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 05 OF 06 BONN 34271

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GE

SUBJECT: THE GERMAN OUESTION AND REUNIFICATION

HEARS MORE AND MORE THE ANALYSIS THAT POLAND'S CURRENT INTEREST IS TO ATTACH ITSELF INCREASINGLY TO THE WESTERN COMMUNITY OF STATES. IT WOULD, THIS ANALYSIS GOES ON, BE IN POLAND'S INTEREST TO HAVE A WESTERN COUNTRY AS ITS NEIGHBOR TO THE WEST. SOME WEST GERMANS ALSO INTERPRETED HUNGARY'S DECISION TO ALLOW THOUSANDS OF EAST GERMANS TO CROSS THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN BORDER ON THEIR WAY TO THE FRG AS A NOD IN THE DIRECTION OF EVENTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF REUNIFICATION.

20. THE FRG'S OSTPOLITIK HAS TO BE VIEWED THROUGH THE PRISM OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE GDR. WEST GERMANY'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES ARE CONSCIOUSLY PERCEIVED AS PROMOTING ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE GDR AND ULTIMATELY DRAWING THE TWO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 34271 05 OF 06 252031Z

STATES CLOSER TOGETHER. IN THIS RESPECT, INNER-GERMAN POLICY HAS DEFINED AND CONTINUES TO DEFINE THE FRG'S OSTPOLITIK. GIVEN ITS CURRENT ECONOMIC PROWESS, THE FRG HAS CONSCIOUSLY TRIED TO ADOPT A LEADERSHIP ROLE AMONG EUROPEAN STATES TO FURTHER REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE, TO FURTHER ECONOMIC COOPERATION, AND TO PRESSURE THE GDR.

ON THE ROAD TO REUNIFICATION

21. FACED WITH THE OPERATIONAL DILEMMA OF HOW TO PROMOTE EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION, A NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL WEST GERMAN LEADERS SUCH AS PRESIDENT VON WEIZSAECKER, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND SPD CHAIRMAN VOGEL HAVE ATTEMPTED TO FRAME A CONCEPT FOR DEFINING THE PROCESS. THEY HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED TO PROVIDE A BLUEPRINT FOR REUNIFICATION. ALTHOUGH THE TERMINOLOGY USED BY THE MAJOR PARTIES IS SOMETIMES DIFFERENT, THE PROCESS THEY HAVE DEFINED IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. THIS MODEL LOOKS FORWARD TO "NORMALIZATION" OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES. THIS WOULD RESULT IN A THICK NETWORK OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THE INITIAL STEPS OF "NORMALIZATION" COULD INCLUDE INTEGRATED POSTAL AND PUBLIC

TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, AN EXPANSION OF CUSTOMS-FREE TRADE, AND POSSIBLY EVEN A UNIFORM CURRENCY. ON THE BASIS OF THIS COOPERATION, WEST AND EAST GERMANY COULD PURSUE A FEDERALIST STRUCTURE -- TWO DIFFERENT STATES, BUT INTEGRATED TO SOME EXTENT.

22. THE INTERNAL HANDWRINGING OVER WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A POLICY OF NORMALIZATION OR ONE AIMED MORE ACTIVELY AT REUNIFICATION IS IN PART BASED ON ANXIETIES ABOUT THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 34271 05 OF 06 252031Z

ATTITUDES OF THE FRG'S ALLIES. THE POINT THAT VON WEIZSAECKER, GENSCHER, AND VOGEL CONTINUE TO REITERATE IS THAT IT IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR GERMANS TO SPEAK IN PUBLIC ABOUT REUNIFICATION. IF IN THE END WESTERN EUROPE ACHIEVES EXTENSIVE INTEGRATION, GERMAN REUNIFICATION MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT MUCH OF THE TRAUMA MANY TODAY ASSOCIATE WITH THE CONCEPT.

REUNIFICATION VIEWED FROM ABROAD

23. THE FRG MEDIA GAVE WIDE COVERAGE TO THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 18 AND THE AMBASSADOR'S SEPTEMBER 3 COMMENTS IN SUPPORT OF REUNIFICATION. SOME DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES HERE (PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND UK) WONDERED WHETHER THE U.S. WAS CHANGING ITS POLICY ON REUNIFICATION AND WAS PREPARING TO ENGAGE IN A MORE ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO PROMOTE REUNIFICATION. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED FROM EMBASSY MOSCOW'S REPORTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE REACTED NEGATIVELY TO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 34271 06 OF 06 251811Z ACTION EUR-00

O 251752Z OCT 89 FM AMEMBASSY BONN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9538 INFO FRG COLLECTIVE CSCE COLLECTIVE USIA WASHDC 1616

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 06 OF 06 BONN 34271

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GE

SUBJECT: THE GERMAN QUESTION AND REUNIFICATION

GREATER PUBLIC ATTENTION TO REUNIFICATION.

24. MANY OF THE SAME HIGH-RANKING WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS WHO HAVE CALLED FOR LESS PUBLIC DISCUSSION ABOUT REUNIFICATION HAVE ALSO TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THEY WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S AND AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS, NOT SO MUCH FOR REITERATING USG SUPPORT FOR REUNIFICATION (WHICH AFTER ALL HAS BEEN U.S. POLICY SINCE THE EARLY FIFTIES) BUT BECAUSE THEY ARE AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE FRG'S FIRM ANCHORING IN THE WEST. THIS IS PARTICULARLY WELCOMED AT A TIME WHEN GERMANY'S EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS TO THE WEST AND EAST ARE RUMBLING IN LESS ENTHUSIASTIC TERMS

ABOUT POSSIBLE REUNIFICATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 34271 06 OF 06 251811Z

THE REUNIFICATION DEBATE TODAY

25. THE PERCEPTION IN THE FRG IS THAT RAPID CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE GDR WILL PROMOTE THE PROCESS OF BRINGING THE TWO GERMANIES CLOSER, PERHAPS EVENTUALLY TO A REUNIFIED STATE. BUT EVEN WITH RAPID CHANGE OCCURING IN BOTH WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE, MOST WEST GERMANS STILL CONSIDER REUNIFICATION NOT TO BE AN IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY.

26. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GERMANS (BOTH EAST AND WEST) ARE IN FAVOR OF REUNIFICATION AND ONLY A SMALL MINORITY OPPOSE IT. THE CONSENSUS ON THE GRADUAL STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH OF WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS A PRECURSOR TO POSSIBLE GERMAN REUNIFICATION CONTINUES TO HOLD. BUT WEST GERMANS KNOW IN THEIR HEART OF HEARTS THAT REUNIFICATION CAN ONLY COME ABOUT WHEN THE FRG'S EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THE SOVIET UNION NOT ONLY GO ALONG WITH THE PROCESS OF REUNIFICATION, BUT ALSO ACTIVELY SUPPORT IT. WEST GERMAN LEADERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IS YET THE CASE.

27. AS A RESULT OF WORLD WAR II, THE FOUR POWERS CONTINUE TO RETAIN RIGHTS FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE AND IN BERLIN. WEST GERMANS ARE FULLY COGNIZANT THAT REUNIFICATION WOULD ULTIMATELY REQUIRE A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE FOUR POWERS (UK, FRANCE, U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION), A DISSOLUTION OF THE FOUR-POWER STATUS OF BERLIN, AND A NEW BODY OF TREATY LAW WITH THE RESULTING UNIFIED GERMANY. THERE IS NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THESE LEGAL ISSUES COULD ONLY BE ADDRESSED ONCE THE FOUR POWERS HAD SHOWN THE POLITICAL WILL TO SUPPORT THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION. OPERATIONALLY, THE FOUR POWERS CONTINUE TO EXERCISE THEIR CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 34271 06 OF 06 251811Z

ORIGINAL RIGHTS THROUGH THE MANAGEMENT OF BERLIN POLICY. AS THE FRG IS ACUTELY AWARE, BERLIN OFFERS THE FOUR POWERS THE MECHANISM WITH WHICH TO IMPLEMENT ANY POLITICAL

DECISION WHICH HAS AS ITS GOAL A FURTHER INTEGRATION OR POSSIBLE UNIFICATION OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES.

28. FOR THE PRESENT, WEST GERMANS HAVE COME TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THERE ARE TWO GERMAN STATES WITH GRADUALLY IMPROVING RELATIONS. THE INFLUX OF LARGE NUMBERS OF EAST GERMANS AND ETHNIC GERMANS FROM EASTERN EUROPE HAS NOT ONLY REPRESENTED A POINT OF PRIDE AMONG WEST GERMANS THAT THEIR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY ARE FAR AND AWAY SUPERIOR TO THE EAST GERMAN MODEL, BUT IT HAS REKINDLED THE EMOTIONAL DESIRE FOR A GERMANY THAT WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE NO BARBED WIRE AND WALLS IN THE MIDDLE. WALTERS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN