

EXCISE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS|FPC|ODR

168

Date: 5/29/97

P 01.1500
(E)

<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	<input type="checkbox"/> MR Cases Only
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXTEND	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	<input type="checkbox"/> EO Citations
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to:
FOIA Exemptions <u>B1, 1.5d</u>		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 35285 01 OF 02 091327Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /000 W
-----062504 091328Z /38

O 091321Z DEC 89 ZFF4 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8562
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 35285

EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

E.O. 12356: DECL/OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT GERMANY

REF: A)MOSCOW 35199 B)MOSCOW 34880

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. TO THE SOVIETS, THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE IN EASTERN EUROPE ARE CHAOS, MASSIVE OUTBURSTS OF ANTI-SOVIETISM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE WARSAW PACT AND THE RE-OPENING OF WORLD WAR II FRONTIER QUESTIONS. TO MANAGE THESE SPECTRES, AS THE PACE OF CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE HAS ACCELERATED IN RECENT MONTHS, THE SOVIETS HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR STABILITY AND FOR AN AGREED INTERNATIONAL PROCESS. WHILE GORBACHEV HAS IN RECENT HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS REITERATED THE CONSISTENCY OF SOVIET POLICIES AND PROJECTED HIS USUAL SENSE OF CONFIDENCE, ENERGY AND DETERMINATION TO EXTRACT THE POSITIVE FROM DEVELOPMENTS, SHEVARDNADZE'S HARSHER AND MORE EMOTIONAL REACTION, AS IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH DUMAS (REP A), HAS, PROBABLY DELIBERATELY, BEEN A MORE ACCURATE REFLECTION OF SOVIET FEARS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 35285 01 OF 02 091327Z

3. THROUGHOUT THE POST-WAR ERA, THE SOVIETS HAVE EQUATED CONTROL OVER EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE WITH

VITAL SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS, AND THEY HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO FIGHT TO MAINTAIN IT. THE GORBACHEV REGIME HAS TAKEN A LEAP INTO THE UNKNOWN, GIVING UP CONTROL AND BARGAINING THAT THEY COULD MAINTAIN INFLUENCE, WHILE INVOLVING THEMSELVES AND THEIR ALLIES MORE PRODUCTIVELY IN EUROPEAN SOCIETY. IN POLAND AND IN HUNGARY, THAT GAMBLE HAS THUS FAR PAID OFF. GORBACHEV'S INITIAL MESSAGE TO WESTERN LEADERS AS THE BERLIN WALL CRUMBLLED REVEALED HIS FEAR THAT IN THE EVEN MORE EMOTIONALLY CHARGED ENVIRONMENT OF EAST GERMANY, THE GAMBLE WOULD FAIL. THOSE FEARS, INITIALLY EASED WHEN THE EAST GERMANS RETURNED TO HOME AND WORK ON MONDAY MORNING, HAVE NOW BEEN REVIVED.

TWO DAYS AGO THAT THE SHARPER SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD EVENTS IN GERMANY IS DUE TO PERCEPTIONS OF INCREASED DISORDER AND A BELIEF THAT KOHL, IN A DEMONSTRATION OF "NATIONAL EGOISM", HAD WITH HIS 10 POINT PROPOSAL BROKEN HIS WORD TO GORBACHEV NOT TO UNDERTAKE ANY PAN-GERMAN INITIATIVE.

4. WE WOULD DO WELL AS WE GAUGE THE SOVIET REACTION TO EVENTS IN THE GDR TO REMEMBER THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL TEND TO SEE CHAOS WHERE WE SEE ONLY DISORDER. IF OUT OF THAT CHAOS THEY BEGIN TO SEE EMERGING THE SHADOWS OF RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM AND GERMAN REVANCHISM, THEIR REACTION MAY BECOME UNPREDICTABLE. WHETHER THOSE SHADOWS REPRESENT OBJECTIVE REALITY OR ONLY THE PROJECTION OF THEIR OWN FEARS COULD BE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 35285 01 OF 02 091327Z

ARGUABLE, BUT IRRELEVANT. THE RIDING OF THESE FOUR HORSEMEN, OR EVEN ANY ONE OF THEM, OVER TERRAIN STILL COVERED IN THE RUSSIAN MIND'S EYE WITH THE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION OF WORLD WAR II COULD SWEEP AWAY VISIONS OF A COMMON EUROPEAN HOME.

5. OUR COLLEAGUES IN MOSCOW'S NATO EMBASSIES TEND GENERALLY TO THE OPINION THAT THE OPTION OF USING FORCE TO CONTROL EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE IS NO LONGER OPEN TO THE SOVIETS. WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT THE GORBACHEV REGIME IS NOT WILLING TO USE FORCE; WHETHER ANY POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR REGIME MIGHT BE SO DISPOSED IS MORE DIFFICULT TO SAY. SOVIET ASSETS IN THE GDR ARE SUFFICIENT TO MAKE IT A CONCEIVABLE OPTION, WITH DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS IN OTHER EASTERN

SECRET
EUROPEAN CAPITALS THAT A DIFFERENT SOVIET REGIME MIGHT CONSIDER SALUTARY. THAT WOULD BE AN ACT OF DESPERATION, AND AN ACT FURTHERMORE THAT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPRACTICABLE NO MATTER WHAT THE REGIME AS SOVIET UNILATERAL AND, LATER, CFE AND PERHAPS CFE II REDUCTIONS CHANGE EUROPEAN MILITARY REALITIES. IN THE MEANTIME, AND EVEN THEN, A MAJOR WESTERN CONCERN SHOULD BE TO AVOID FEEDING SOVIET PSYCHOSES.

6. THE GORBACHEV REGIME'S ATTEMPTS TO INVOKE A PROCESS FOR MANAGING EVENTS IN GERMANY HAS AS MUCH TO DO WITH THE DOMESTIC AS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. A CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM IS BEING HELD IN MOSCOW TODAY (DECEMBER 9). WHILE ITS PUTATIVE AGENDA IS PRIMARILY ECONOMIC, THERE MUST BE CONCERNS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ABOUT WHETHER THEIR COMPETENCE TO HANDLE SOVIET SECURITY

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 35285 02 OF 02 091327Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /000 W
-----062507 091328Z /38

O 091321Z DEC 89 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8563
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 35285

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECLASSIFIED

TAGS: PREL, UR, US

SUBJECT: SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT GERMANY

INTERESTS WILL BE QUESTIONED AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE ALSO COPING WITH A DISMAL ECONOMIC SITUATION, A CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE, EFFORTS TO ABOLISH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRE-EMINENCE OF THE CPSU, AND THE OPENING IN THREE DAYS OF A CRITICAL AND PROBABLY CONTENTIOUS SESSION OF THE COUNTRY'S HIGHEST LAW-MAKING BODY, THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES. WHILE MOSCOW'S STREETS ARE CALM, ITS POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IS CHARGED.

7. IN CALLING FOR A FOUR-POWER MEETING IN BERLIN, GORBACHEV WANTS TO BE ABLE TO TELL HIS CRITICS THAT, WHILE THE SITUATION IN THE GDR IS SERIOUS, EVENTS ARE NOT OUT OF CONTROL, THAT SOVIET CONCERNS ARE SHARED BY THE OTHER MAJOR POWERS AND THAT THEY ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO FIND A WAY TO MANAGE THEM FOR THE COMMON GOOD. HE WILL WANT TO BE ABLE TO ASSERT THAT THANKS TO HIS POLICIES SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS CAN BE PROTECTED BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS RATHER THAN BY MILITARY CONFRONTATION. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO RESPOND TO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 35285 02 OF 02 091327Z

THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS IN A WAY THAT HELPS GIVE CREDIBILITY TO THIS ASSERTION.
MATLOCK