

SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO

9 April 1981

Cde. K. U. CHERNENKO presiding.

Also taking part: Cdes. Yu. V. Andropov, M. S. Gorbachev, V. V. Grishin,
A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, M. A. Suslov,
D. F. Ustinov, P. N. Demichev, V. V. Kuznetsov,
M. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I. Dolgikh,
M. V. Zimyanin

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3. On the Results of the Meeting Held by Cdes. Yu. V. Andropov and D. F. Ustinov
with the Polish Friends

CHERNENKO. In accordance with the Politburo's decision, Comrades Andropov and Ustinov met with Cdes. Kania and Jaruzelski. Let's listen to what the comrades have to say.

ANDROPOV. Cde. D. F. Ustinov and I, as we agreed with the Polish comrades, traveled to Brest and held a meeting there in a train car right near Brest. The meeting began at 9:00 p.m. and ended at 3:00 a.m. so that no one would discover that the Polish comrades had gone off somewhere.¹

The task we faced was to listen closely to the Polish comrades and to offer appropriate explanations, as we arranged at the Politburo session.

The general impression from our meeting with the comrades was that they were very tense and nervous, and it was obvious that they were worn out.² Cde. Kania said

¹ Translator's Note: For Kania's and Jaruzelski's retrospective accounts of the Brest meeting, see Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje*, pp. 121-122; and Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992), pp. 95-101.

² Translator's Note: This observation tallies well with the recollections of Army-General Anatolii Gribkov, who accompanied Kania and Jaruzelski to the airport as they were about to fly to Brest. In his 1992 article ("Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," p. 50) Gribkov wrote that when he "was speaking with S. Kania and W. Jaruzelski just before their flight I could sense their great agitation. Their mood, frankly speaking, was very depressed. Their faces were tense, and their glances seemed distrustful. . . . It seemed to me that they had doubts about how soon they might be allowed to return home [from Brest]. When we approached the boarding stairs of the aircraft, . . . W. Jaruzelski asked me to board the plane with him, evidently because he had some sort of doubts about what he would find there." Perhaps,

candidly that it's very difficult for them to conduct their business under constant pressure from Solidarity and the antisocialist forces. Despite that, they declared that in the wake of the CPSU's 26th Congress, the situation in Poland is beginning to stabilize. Kania said that they had held electoral conferences in the majority of the primary party organizations, and that typically not a single person belonging to Solidarity had been included among the delegates.³ That is, our candidates were chosen for the congress. But then Cde. Kania felt compelled to say that recent events, particularly the warning strike and the events in Bydgoszcz, had shown that the counterrevolution is stronger than we are. They were especially frightened by the warning strike and, even more, by the prospect of a general strike.⁴ They were doing everything possible to prevent a general strike.

In discussing the tasks still before them, Cde. Kania said that above all they had to restore the people's trust in the Party, improve economic life, and eliminate strikes and work stoppages at enterprises. Of course the Polish comrades have no experience in struggling against these negative phenomena, and therefore they don't currently know what methods to use. They are lurching from side to side. With regard to the introduction of troops, they flatly said that this is absolutely impossible, just as it is also impossible to introduce martial law.⁵ They say they won't understand it and will be powerless to do anything.⁶ The comrades emphasized in the conversation that they will

Jaruzelski had in mind what happened in Budapest in November 1956, both before and after Soviet troops invaded Hungary. On 3 November, a Hungarian military delegation led by the national defense minister, Pal Maleter, was due to hold negotiations with Soviet officials about the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary. But instead of holding negotiations, Soviet KGB and military officers arrested the Hungarian delegates. After the invasion, the leader of Hungary, Imre Nagy, fled with several aides to the Yugoslav embassy for sanctuary. Soviet and Hungarian officials persuaded Nagy and the others to emerge from the embassy on 22 November, with promises that they would not be harmed. But as soon as Nagy's group left the embassy, they were arrested by Soviet KGB troops and transported to Romania as prisoners.

³ Translator's Note: Actually, about 20 percent of the delegates to the PZPR's Extraordinary 9th Congress (held on 14-20 July) were members of Solidarity. The proportion would have been much higher except that the large majority of Solidarity members spurned all activities connected with the Party.

⁴ Translator's Note: See the annotations in Transcript of the CPSU Politburo Session, 2 April 1981. This issue also came up during Kulikov's discussions with Kania and Jaruzelski in Warsaw just before the Brest meeting. In a conversation with East German military officials on 7 April, Kulikov said he had "tried to make it clear to Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski that they don't need to fear a general strike." He emphasized to the Polish leaders that "because Solidarity's members know that the party and state leadership of the People's Republic of Poland are afraid there will be a general strike, they are able to take advantage of this to exert pressure and get their demands fulfilled." Kulikov insisted that any such strike should be forcibly suppressed, "just as the capitalists always respond to strikes." Quoted from "Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA," Bl. 55.

⁵ Translator's Note: This corresponds precisely with what Marshal Kulikov reportedly heard during his conversations with Kania and Jaruzelski in early April 1981. According to the top-secret East German account of Kulikov's findings, Kania and Jaruzelski "subtly indicated to [Kulikov] that if there were an invasion [of Poland] by other Warsaw Pact forces, it is conceivable that some units [of the Polish army] would rebel." Quoted from "Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA," Bl. 54.

⁶ Translator's Note: No doubt, Soviet leaders took these warnings seriously after the experience with Czechoslovakia in 1968. Hard-line forces in the Czechoslovak Communist Party had assured the CPSU

restore order by their own means. They have in mind that the 9th Congress, for which they are now preparing, will not enable Solidarity to field its own candidates as delegates. In the party organizations they are selecting good workers as delegates for the congress.⁷

During the discussion, Cde. Kania also noted that the Polish people are very sensitive to truthful messages. For example, the leadership spoke about the congress, then began to hint that the congress might be postponed, and then again said that the congress would be held. This sort of wavering about the schedule for the congress took a heavy toll on the atmosphere in the country in the sense that trust in the party eroded even further. In turn we said firmly to the Polish comrades that the enemy is attacking you while you still have advantages, but you just make concessions and have ended up losing precious time. In September 1980 it would have been possible to put up a serious fight against the enemy. But you didn't do anything; you took no sorts of measures, neither political nor, even more, administrative. We especially emphasized that it's impossible to trade off military-administrative measures for political measures. They must all be pursued together.

With regard to martial law, it would have been possible to introduce it long ago. You know what the introduction of martial law would mean. It would help them smash the onslaught of the counterrevolutionary forces and other rowdy forces, and put an end once and for all to the strikes and anarchy in economic life. A draft document on the introduction of martial law has been prepared with the help of our comrades, and these documents must be signed.⁸ The Polish comrades say: But how can we sign these

Politburo that they would be able to seize power and restore order quickly once Soviet troops arrived. But when the invasion occurred, the pro-Moscow group proved utterly "powerless to do anything." See Mark Kramer, "The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine," in Carole Fink, Dietlef Junker, and Philipp Gassert, eds., 1968: *The World Transformed* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 156-159.

⁷ Translator's Note: Actually, only about 20 percent of the delegates to the Ninth Congress were workers.

⁸ Translator's Note: All key planning documents prepared by the Polish General Staff and Internal Affairs Ministry were closely supervised by Soviet military and KGB officials. In April 1981, Marshal Kulikov informed East German military leaders that "the entire array of documentation for martial law [in Poland] was prepared in close cooperation by Soviet and Polish comrades." (Quoted from "Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gespräch mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkräfte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA," Bl. 54.) The same point was stressed in 1992 by General Gribkov, who recalled that "at the request of the Polish leadership, a number of [Soviet] officers and generals from the staff of the Joint Armed Forces [of the Warsaw Pact] took part in the planning work [for martial law]." A similar role was accorded to Soviet KGB officials in 1980-81, as described by Kuklinski, Kania, and Vitalii Pavlov, the KGB station chief in Warsaw. A high-ranking Soviet military delegation headed by Gribkov, and a senior KGB delegation led by Vladimir Kryuchkov, traveled to Poland in mid-February 1981 to oversee staff games at the Polish Internal Defense Forces headquarters, which tested the draft planning documents. A large number of Soviet military and KGB officers, including Kulikov, Gribkov, and Kryuchkov, were back in Warsaw in late March 1981 to supervise the completion of the initial planning materials. Once the Soviet officials had given their consent, Kania and Jaruzelski felt free to sign the three documents. See Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 48-49; "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," pp. 21-22, 31-32; Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje*, pp. 117-120; Vitalii Pavlov, *Bylem rezydentem w Polsce* (Warsaw: BGW, 1994), pp. 257-258; and Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego*, pp. 88-91. Andropov is referring here to implementation directives that would have turned the planning documents into action. Soviet efforts to get Kania and Jaruzelski to sign the directives were aimed at forcing them to set a date for the introduction of martial law.

documents, when they haven't yet been approved by the Sejm, etc. We say that there's no need to submit them to the Sejm, and that these documents will specify what they must do when they introduce martial law. We say that now you personally, Cdes. Kania and Jaruzelski, must sign the documents so that we can be sure you agree with them and will know what must be done during martial law. When it comes time to introduce martial law, there'll be no time then to work out the measures for doing so; you must work them out beforehand. That's the point of all this.

Then, after our explanation, Cdes. Kania and Jaruzelski said that on 11 April they'll look over and sign this document.⁹

We then asked what Cde. Jaruzelski would say in his speech to the Sejm. Jaruzelski spoke a lot, but indistinctly. He explained that he will speak about a ban on strikes for two months.¹⁰ We ask: And what's the significance of two months? What will happen after these two months? Two months will pass quickly, and then strikes will start all over again. You gave many promises to your workers, but you didn't fulfill them, and you're just creating an even greater basis for a lack of trust in the government and the PZPR.

Now an especially urgent question must be addressed about carrying out broad political measures. By way of explaining this question, consider the shortages of bread and other products in your country. Why does this occur? Because the constant strikes are disorienting the whole economy, no more no less. Billions and billions of zlotys are being lost with each strike, but workers don't realize that, and the blame for the whole situation falls upon the government. The government, the Party's Central Committee, and the Politburo are blamed, and the ringleaders and organizers of the strikes stand to the side and appear to be the defenders of workers' interests. But, we say, you know that those who are really to blame for all these economic hardships are Solidarity and the organizers of the strikes. Hence, why is it not possible to bring all this to the attention of

Blanks in the documents were to be filled in with dates when the two leaders affixed their signatures. Soviet officials evidently believed that if Kania and Jaruzelski formally pledged in writing to impose martial law by a specific date, it would be a "credible commitment" that would give the Polish leaders little choice but to proceed with a crackdown. On earlier Soviet efforts to seek "credible commitments" during Soviet-East European crises, see Mark Kramer, "Ukraine and the 1968 Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis (Part 1): New Evidence from the Diary of Petro Shelest," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue No. 10 (March 1998), pp. 239-243.

⁹ Translator's Note: On 11 April, Kania and Jaruzelski continued to avoid signing the documents. Jaruzelski put off a meeting with Marshal Kulikov for two days; and even when the two men finally met on 13 April, the Polish leader declined to set a date for martial law or to sign the documents. See Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego*, pp. 93-95; and Jaruzelski, *Les chaines et le refuge*, pp. 255-256. Not until several months later (by which time Jaruzelski had succeeded Kania as PZPR First Secretary) was a date for martial law finally set.

¹⁰ Translator's Note: On 12 February 1981, just after taking over as prime minister, Jaruzelski had given a speech at the Sejm in which he called for a three-month moratorium on strikes to allow for "the introduction of a program of economic stabilization" and "a sweeping reform of the economy." That appeal went unheeded, as strikes continued in many parts of the country. But Jaruzelski's appeal on 10 April for "a suspension of strikes and the threat of strikes for two months" met with greater success. Although Solidarity indicated that it still reserved the right to strike if its fundamental interests were at stake, Walesa and others left little doubt that they would try to discourage strikes. The *de facto* strike moratorium lasted until early July.

the workers?

There's a good deal of talk in your country about the creation of a Front of National Salvation for Poland. Such conversations are taking place in numerous regions. This proposed Front of National Salvation for Poland would include veterans of the revolutionary movement, military commanders such as, for example, Rola-Zymierski, and others.¹¹ This, too, might be noted. Or consider, for example, that in the Federal Republic of Germany now there's talk about taking Silesia and Gdansk as territories, which are now part of Poland, and giving them back to the FRG.¹² Why isn't this question being played up? I think that the people might unite around such matters. You need to do something to boost people's spirits.

We said that no one in your country is objecting to the creation of a National Front of Salvation for Poland. But this front must not be a substitute for the Party and government.

An especially critical matter is the struggle for unity within the Party and unity of the nation. A good deal has been said about the unity of the Party. We want to encourage you still more to take all necessary measures to unite the Party and create unity within the nation. As far as what measures should be adopted, you yourselves should know that better. But there are many questions. We already mentioned things to you around which it would be possible to unite the nation and create unity within the Party. The Polish comrades spoke about bringing three workers into the Politburo. They got this idea from Lenin, who proposed bringing workers into the Politburo. We said that the situation in our country was such that we didn't need to bring workers into the Politburo.¹³ But if you

¹¹ Translator's Note: Michal Zymierski fought in the Polish Legions during World War I and was soon afterwards made a general. He was one of the commanders of loyalist forces against Marshal Jozef Pilsudski during the *coup d'etat* in Poland in May 1926. Zymierski was imprisoned for five years and then forced to live abroad. In World War II he first served as the top military adviser to the staff of the Soviet-sponsored People's Guard and then, under the *nom de guerre* "Rola," he commanded the Polish People's Army. In 1945, Rola-Zymierski became the Commander-in-Chief of the integrated Polish Army under Soviet auspices and was promoted to the rank of marshal. He served as the nominal minister of national defense until 1949. Rola-Zymierski was arrested during the Stalinist purges, but was never tried. He was rehabilitated in 1956 and was appointed to several honorary posts thereafter. At the PZPR's Ninth Congress in July 1981, he was elected to the PZPR Central Committee at the age of 91.

¹² Translator's Note: As part of the settlement in Europe at the end of World War II, Poland was given jurisdiction over regions of Silesia and Pomerania that had previously been under German control. These westward territorial adjustments were intended, in part, to compensate for territory in the east that Poland lost in 1945 to the Soviet Union. To ensure firm control over the new territories, the Polish government ordered the expulsion of some 3 million ethnic Germans. Extensive analyses of this matter, based on new archival sources, are featured in a forthcoming book edited by Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, *Expulsion, Resettlement, and Integration: Forced Migration and Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1945-1956* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). Throughout the postwar era, some of the Germans who had been expelled from Silesia and Pomerania formed lobbying groups in West Germany that called for those territories to be returned to German rule. Although the West German authorities declined to support this demand, the German government did not formally renounce all claims to Polish Silesia and Pomerania until 1990.

¹³ Translator's Note: The Soviet authorities had long been accustomed to including a handful of blue-collar workers on the CPSU Central Committee, but that was mainly because the Central Committee was little more than a figurehead organ. Real power rested with the CPSU Politburo.

now generally have such a demand, you might bring some workers into the Politburo — though not necessarily three, but perhaps only one. You might select a certain additional number of workers for the Central Committee; these are all measures that could promote the cohesion and unity of the Party. For example, you're now talking about bringing workers into the Central Control Commission. That's not a bad idea. Of course, you'd have to implement it.

In addition, the unity of the Party might also be facilitated by the adoption of measures such as speeches given at Party assemblies by well-qualified, well-prepared comrades. We cited examples from our own experience in which we, right up to the members of the Politburo, have spoken at Party assemblies. They agreed with those recommendations.

We also said that it's not necessary for you, comrades, to burden yourselves with grand, far-flung programs; just adopt moderate programs, but be sure to fulfill them. All the members of the Politburo must speak at large enterprises. Cde. Kania, for example, is going now to Gdansk.¹⁴ And not only Cde. Kania, but also Cde. Jaruzelski and all the other members and candidate members of the Politburo are traveling to different cities to speak at enterprises among workers, that is, to speak against organized Solidarity, juxtaposing their own real solidarity. What makes Solidarity strong? It's strong because of its demagoguery. It demagogically promises increased pay to the workers, and it succeeded in this, as you see. It has also succeeded in defending workers, and its authority has reached the point where a strike is declared when you arrest some workers or other officials of Solidarity.

We directly said to Kania that every day you keep backing down and backing down. You must take action; you must proceed with military measures and emergency measures.

A crucial question has arisen about the complexion of the Sejm. What is Solidarity doing? It is now busy trying to cultivate every member of the Sejm. It is suggesting to workers who are members of the Sejm that they speak at the Sejm and concretely denounce the PZPR and the socialist order. You must thwart these plans of Solidarity. Why, for example, haven't all the deputies of the Sejm been called together and prepared for the session by members of the Politburo, who should say that they are accountable for these deputies? That's where things should go. For example, a worker who is a member of the PZPR plenum received a telegram telling him that he must speak at the plenum in accordance with the instructions he was given. The speech of this worker at the plenum was delayed; that is, he didn't want to speak. He received another telegram which said: "Why didn't we hear you speak?" The worker again didn't deliver a speech, and the plenum ended. He received yet another telegram: "There's no turning back." You see that here Solidarity is terrorizing this worker and intimidating him. That's how Solidarity operates.

¹⁴Translator's Note: It turned out, however, that Kania spent almost his entire trip in Gdansk enduring angry criticism at the Lenin Shipyard from Party members sympathetic to Solidarity. The meeting lasted some seven hours.

With regard to the base of the Politburo and on whom it might rely, their army numbers 400,000 soldiers, the internal affairs ministry 100,000, and the reservists 300,000 — that is, 800,000 in all. Kania said that tensions have now diminished somewhat, and they have succeeded in preventing a general strike. But whether that will be enough to alleviate the situation is difficult to say.

What are they doing after our meeting? Well, they're doing a few things. For example, Kania is traveling to Gdansk. Cde. Jaruzelski is recasting his speech for the Sejm. But we should note that there are many differences of view between Kania and Jaruzelski on individual matters. Cde. Jaruzelski has again requested that he be released from his post as prime minister. We explained to him that it's essential for him to remain in that post and continue his worthy performance in the duties facing him. We emphasized that the enemy is preparing its forces to seize power.

On the other hand, other members of the Politburo, such as Cdes. Olszowski and Grabski, have embraced a somewhat different position — a position firmer than that of the leadership.¹⁵ We must work with them. In particular, they are proposing to form an underground Politburo and carry out their work.¹⁶ It turns out that they got this idea from

¹⁵ Translator's Note: This comment was echoed a week later in a report prepared by the CPSU Politburo's Commission on Poland, which affirmed that some high-ranking Polish Communists, "such as Grabski, Zabinski, Olszowski, Kociolek, and others, have adopted positions in the ideological sphere that are closest to our own. They express the sentiments of party members who consistently support socialism and friendship with the Soviet Union, and who oppose revisionist excesses and demand resolute action against Solidarity. . . . Unfortunately, representatives of this viewpoint are now far from a majority." The report distinguished the Grabski-Olszowski-Zabinski faction from both the "rightists" within the PZPR ("revisionist officials such as Fiszbach, Werblan, Rakowski, and Jablonski, who are ideologically close to some of the leaders of Solidarity") and the party's centrists (Kania and Jaruzelski, who "have behaved passively and hesitantly, making numerous concessions in favor of Solidarity" and who have "displayed insufficient firmness and steadfastness in the struggle against the counterrevolutionary forces"). Quoted from "O razvitii obstanovki v Pol'she i nekotorykh shagakh s nashei storony," L. 3. See also "Ob ideino-politicheskikh kontseptsyakh 'reformatorskogo kryla' v PORP (Spravka)," Cable No. 531 (Secret), from V. Mutsii, first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Poland, 22 June 1981, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 598, Ll. 116-121.

¹⁶ Translator's Note: Subsequently, organizations like the Gdansk Patriotic Union and the Katowice Party Forum emerged as hard-line (and often openly anti-Semitic) critics of the regime, but these groups, despite having ties with Olszowski and Grabski, did not function as a full-fledged "underground Politburo." Unlike in 1968, when Soviet leaders secretly encouraged the "healthy forces" in Czechoslovakia (i.e., the pro-Soviet hardliners) to set up an alternative regime that could replace Alexander Dubcek, the Soviet authorities in 1981 preferred to rely on the existing leader, Jaruzelski, for as long as possible. Although the CPSU Politburo's special Commission on Poland (led by Suslov) approved a report in mid-February 1981 that called for links to be established with the PZPR's "healthy forces," this did not imply that an "underground Politburo" should be formed. (See Voronkov, "Sobytiya 1980-1981 gg. v Pol'she," p. 106.) Andropov's statement that "we must work with" the "healthy forces" indicates that the option of replacing Jaruzelski with Olszowski, Grabski, Andrzej Zabinski, or some other hardline civilian or military official was always present (see my annotations in Transcript of the CPSU Politburo Session, 2 April 1981), but this option would have been pursued only if Jaruzelski had explicitly refused to prepare for (and then implement) martial law. Evidently, one of the reasons that Soviet leaders were leery of encouraging the formation of an alternative PZPR Politburo is that, at least in the spring of 1981, the hardliners in Poland "were convinced that the situation could not be rectified without the introduction of Soviet troops." Quoted from "O razvitii obstanovki v Pol'she i nekotorykh shagakh s nashei storony," L. 3.

advice given to them by Cde. Zhivkov. I don't know whether this is true or not, but they say that Cde. Zhivkov gave them such advice. We, too, must conclude from this that if the leaders of other fraternal parties are going to offer the Polish friends such advice, we of course will gain nothing from it and will only lose by it.

SUSLOV. Perhaps we must prepare information for the other fraternal parties.

GROMYKO. If so, we should definitely not mention that a meeting took place.

ANDROPOV. Yes, it's absolutely impossible to refer to the meeting.¹⁷

USTINOV. Yu. V. Andropov discussed everything very well, and therefore I just briefly want to mention the following. First, that we were really struck by the dejected condition of our interlocutors. Even so, it seems to me that we still need this pair — Kania and Jaruzelski — to stick together and strengthen their relations. There are indeed disagreements within their Politburo. These of course are caused most of all by the strikes, which they're very afraid of. We asked why they had changed their decision on Bydgoszcz. As you know, they didn't want to back down on the Bydgoszcz conflict, but then they did back down. They asserted that the threat of a general strike was hanging over them.¹⁸ We also asked them why they were paying workers during strikes. They say that Solidarity has demanded this. We responded that this meant they were just adopting Solidarity's own line. On the question of Rural Solidarity, they have not yet reached a final decision, but they have already recognized the de facto existence of this organization.¹⁹

Yurii Vladimirovich and I gave particular emphasis to the need for unity within the Politburo. There is no need to bring three workers into the Politburo, as they said they were intending to do. This will not strengthen the Politburo. With regard to the Central Committee, there you can bring in workers, but only if it is done in the standard and regular manner, in accordance with the Party statutes. It's especially necessary, we said to the Polish friends, to work properly with the deputies of the Sejm. They are holding so-called selection conferences. These essentially are open telephone conversations. Everything that is said becomes known instantly to a wide circle, including officials of Solidarity. What about the procedure for these conferences? We cited the example of Leonid Il'ich's constant discussions with the secretaries of provincial and territorial CPSU committees and with the secretaries of Central Committees of the union-republic parties. With each he speaks concretely, discussing matters relevant to the particular area.

To diminish their aversion to the introduction of emergency rule or martial law, we cited the example of many countries in which emergency rule or martial law was

¹⁷ Translator's Note: Later on, however, Soviet leaders did discuss the Brest meeting with their East European colleagues. See, for example, "Vermerk über das Treffen der Genossen Leonid Il'ic Breznev, Erich Honecker und Gustav Husak am 16. Mai 1981 im Kreml in Moskau," 18 May 1981 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, vorl. SED 41599.

¹⁸ Translator's Note: See the annotations in Transcript of the CPSU Politburo Session, 2 April 1981.

¹⁹ Translator's Note: See the relevant annotation in Transcript of the CPSU Politburo Session, 22 January 1981.

introduced as soon as there was even a hint of an uprising or the start of some sort of disorder. Take Yugoslavia: When demonstrations were held in Kosovo, they introduced martial law and no one said a word about it.²⁰ It's simply incomprehensible to us why the Poles are afraid to introduce emergency rule.

Yurii Vladimirovich spoke well about the plans for introducing martial law. We said that it is necessary to sign the plan drafted by our comrades.

I then directly asked them, as we arranged at the Politburo, what will happen in Poland, what sort of economic state will it be in, if you botch things up there? At the moment Poland is receiving all its oil for about half-price from the Soviet Union. It is also receiving cotton, iron ore, and many other goods. And if it doesn't receive these goods, what will happen? Why isn't this fact being explained and brought to the attention of the workers?²¹ It could be a powerful weapon. You must speak about this to the workers, you must also speak about it to Solidarity. Right now Solidarity has entrenched itself at the largest factories. These factories must be taken away from Solidarity. You have good factories where the directors stand behind the leadership. For example, the television factory. You can and must support the branch trade unions and conduct active work with them. Jaruzelski then said to me again that he isn't able to do such work and no longer has any strength, and he urged that he be released from his post.

ZIMYANIN. Being in Bulgaria at the congress, we met with Grabski.²² Notes from this conversation were distributed, and the comrades have been able to read through them. From this meeting it is clear that the situation within their Politburo is very difficult. There is no unity, and Yurii Vladimirovich and Dmitrii Fyodorovich correctly said that they must work on fostering unity within the Politburo.

They ordered:

1. That the discussions held by Cdes. Yu. V. Andropov and D. F. Ustinov with the PZPR CC First Secretary, Cde. S. Kania, and the Chairman of the PPR Council of

²⁰ Translator's Note: Large-scale unrest had erupted among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in March 1981, provoking a swift (though not entirely successful) crackdown by the Yugoslav authorities. This was the first serious turmoil in Yugoslavia since Tito's death in May 1980. A U.S. military intelligence report in early April 1981, drawing on statements by the head of Yugoslav military intelligence, discussed the unrest in Kosovo and its link with the Polish crisis. (Unfortunately, all comments about Kosovo were sanitized in the declassified version of this document.) See "[sanitized name] Comments on Poland and Kosovo," INFO Report 1348Z, 7 April 1981, in National Security Archive, Flashpoints Collection.

²¹ Translator's Note: This same point was frequently raised by hardline members of the PZPR. Zdzislaw Drewniowski informed Soviet officials that "when the government of the USSR approved a decision to ship 36,000 [actually 30,000—M.K.] tons of meat to the PPR, Polish television featured a broadcast that said 'today 100 tons of meat arrived at the border station from the USSR,' and then added a bit later that '10,000 packages of consumer goods have arrived from Western countries' (while neglecting to mention that each package weighs only 1-2 kilograms)." Quoted from "Informatsiya o nekotorykh sobytiyakh v Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respublike," L. 42.

²² Translator's Note: The reference here is to the recent Twelfth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, which Zimyanin and others had attended in lieu of Brezhnev. Tadeusz Grabksi was among the Polish officers who attended.

Ministers and Minister of National Defense, Cde. W. Jaruzelski, be approved.

2. That the CC Politburo Commission on Poland be instructed to keep close track of the developing situation in the PPR and, in case of necessity, to draft appropriate recommendations.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 40]