Primary Sources

More Alarming News from Poland

Description

Deeply concerned about the ongoing economic and political crisis in Poland in the early 1980s, Soviet leaders regularly communicated with Polish officials, providing advice, support, and criticism. These meeting notes from April 2, 1981, of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union convey Soviet leaders' dissatisfaction, frustration, and even anger with Polish leaders' lack of concrete action against and leniency toward the Solidarity movement. Polish officials, according to these notes, were not following the recommendations provided by Soviet leaders. As this document shows, some Soviet officials called for "extraordinary" measures, including the introduction of martial law, which was eventually introduced in December 1981 in Poland. Notably, these notes also point to the Soviet leaders' concern about the spread of Solidarity to parts of the Soviet Union.

Source

CC CPSU Politburo, "On the Matter of the Situation in Poland," 2 March 1981, Cold War International History Project, Virtual Archive, CWIHP (accessed May 14, 2008).

Primary Source—Excerpt

...BREZHNEV. All of us are deeply alarmed by the further course of events in Poland. What's worst of all is that the friends listen and agree with our recommendations, but in practice do nothing....

I will speak briefly about my most recent telephone conversation with [Stanislaw] Kania [first secretary of the Communist Party in Poland]....

Cde. Kania acknowledged that they are acting too leniently and need to be more forceful.

... I said to him: "Well, how many times have we insisted to you that you need to take decisive measures, and that you can't keep making endless concessions to 'Solidarity.' You always speak about a peaceful path, but you don't understand (or at least don't wish to understand) that a 'peaceful path' of the sort you're after is likely to cost you blood."...

GROMYKO. ... In any case we must be sure to emphasize to the Polish comrades the necessity of adopting harsher — I would say extraordinary — measures to restore order, and to emphasize that further concessions are simply intolerable....

ANDROPOV. ... If an extraordinary congress is convened, we can't rule out the possibility that it will be completely dominated by representatives of Solidarity, and that they will then be able to stage a bloodless coup. We need to meet again personally with the Polish leaders, ... so that we can urge them to adopt severe measures and not to be afraid of what might result, possibly even bloodshed....

BREZHNEV. We must tell them this means the introduction of martial law and explain it all very plainly.

ANDROPOV. That's right, we must tell them precisely that the introduction of martial law means the establishment of a curfew, limitations on movement along city streets, and stepped-up protection for state and Party institutions, enterprises, etc....

In addition, I want to say that the Polish events are influencing the situation in the western provinces of our country, particularly in Belorussia. Many villages there are listening in to Polish-language radio and television.... Here we, too, must adopt severe measures internally....

How to Cite this Source

Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, "More Alarming News From Poland." Making the History of 1989, Item # 257.